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Abstract—  Several recent cases judged by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities have raised interesting 
issues on the possibility for operators of food chains to use 
national quality signs indicating a territory of origin, different 
from the European regulatory ones (Protected Geographical 
Indications). These various attempts from France, Germany 
and Belgium were all condemned as protectionist policies 
contradicting the free movement of goods between Member 
States in the European Market. However, the condemned 
national policies can be seen as defending the viability of 
specific kinds of activities (of small enterprises) in specific 
places (rural areas). These cases as a consequence, form a good 
illustration of the difficulty that a government faces while 
trying to make compatible the protection of certain traditional 
activities with free markets. Exploring this idea, the 
presentation of the court rulings is developed in the first 
section. In the second section, the economic theoretical 
categories these cases raised are investigated. This helps to 
answer to the question of the best way to ensure market niches 
through products’ quality in the context analysed. Collective 
trademark as a form of intellectual property right is in 
particular highlighted. The third section considers the Court 
decisions on this basis.
Keywords—  Free Movement of Goods, Geographical 
Indications, Collective Trademarks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several recent cases judged by the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (the Court) have raised interesting 
issues on the possibility for operators of food chains to use 
national quality signs indicating a territory of origin, 
different from the European regulatory ones. These later are 
known as Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) and 
form intellectual property rights protected with the 
European Regulation 510/2006 (the European 
Regulation[1]). The various attempts from France
1 (a list of 
quality signs as ‘Salaison d’Auvergne’ for example that did 
not point out a specific product but a class of products), 
Germany
2 (‘Markenqualität aus deutschen Landen’ sign) 
                                                           
                                                          
1 Cases C-321/94, C-322/94, C-323/94, C-325/00, C-255/03, C-
6/02 
2 Case C-280/01 
and Belgium
3 (‘Walloon’ sign) were all condemned as 
protectionist policies contradicting the free movement of 
goods between Member States in the European Market. 
These national policies however can be seen as defending 
the viability of specific kind of activities (of small 
enterprises) in specific places (rural areas). These cases, as a 
consequence, form a good illustration of the difficulty that a 
government faces when it tries to make compatible the 
protection or the viability of certain traditional activities 
with free markets. Interestingly, supporting the rural 
economy development is also an aim for the European 
Regulation. Together with the concern of delivering 
information on goods quality to consumers, attention is paid 
to rural economy in the European Regulation’s preamble 
with particular consideration for less-favoured area: “the 
promotion of products having certain characteristics can be 
of considerable benefit to the rural economy, particularly in 
less-favoured or remote areas, by improving the incomes of 
farmers and by retaining the rural population in these 
areas.”
4
Are these ideas taken into account into the Court 
decision? How could they be considered in its ruling? The 
paper explores these questions. For that purpose, the 
presentation of the cases is developed in the first section. A 
link between the ‘national heritage’ that a PGI would 
represent and the concept of public good is proposed in 
order to highlight the Court decisions. This however clearly 
asks the question of the theoretical categories involved in 
the Court decisions. If the geographical indications (GIs) at 
stake in these cases cannot be considered as PGI, what 
should be their legal statute? This question can be stated in 
another way: what should be the best way to ensure market 
niches through products’ quality for producers in the 
context analysed (i.e. where the public good aspect is not 
straightforward)? In order to answer to these questions, the 
second section presents the cases. The third section 
proposes to interpret the condemned names and regional 
labels as ‘clubs’. This will allow to present ‘collective 
trademarks’ as an alternative way to protect the club’s 
intellectual property rights. On this basis, the fourth section 
 
3 Case C-255/03 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006, Point (2) of the preamble. 
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considers the Court decisions out of the free movement of 
goods rule. It studies the implications for society of shifting 
the protection mode of names and label from national 
policies to collective trademark regime. 
II. PRESENTATION OF THE CASES 
The cases studied in this paper share a lot of 
characteristics. First the parties are always the same. 
The applicant is the Commission of the EC whereas 
the defendant is a Member State of the EC (France,
 
Germany, Belgium depending on the cases). Second, 
the matter at issue is all the time the same: a national 
legal protection afforded to names or regional labels 
containing a geographical indication, explicitly 
(Salaisons d’Auvergne, Savoie, Franche Comté…) or 
implicitly (Montagne for example, where ‘Montagne’ 
means ‘French mountains’). Third, the judgement is 
always the same. In every case the national legal 
protection is found to violate the provisions of Article 
28 EC stipulating that “Quantitative restrictions on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall 
be prohibited between Member States”. Finally, the 
Court always refused to consider that the different 
national legal protections at stake came under Article 
30 EC
5 which lists possible exceptions to Article 28 
EC among which ‘the protection of industrial and 
commercial property’. Here is the heart of the matter. 
GIs are indeed recognized as intellectual property 
rights in the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade 
Organization. In this international institutional context, 
the European Union (EU) is generally considered as a 
strong supporter of GIs (see [2]). The Court did not 
however acknowledge the status of industrial and 
commercial property to the names and regional labels 
at stake in these cases since they were not registered as 
PGIs under the European Regulation 2081/92
6 on the 
                                                           
                                                          
5 Article 30 states that “The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 
shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection 
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and 
commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall 
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States”. 
6 Now European Regulation 510/2006. 
protection of GIs. Furthermore, because these names 
and regional labels referred to classes of products 
rather than to single products, the Courts pointed out 
that they could not be considered as PGIs in the 
European framework anyway. 
What lesson can be drawn from these cases? In the 
cases judged no harm consisting of economic or 
financial loss was directly at stake. Each time, the 
national legal protections were attacked by the 
European Commission as such, because of their 
potential to discriminate on ground of nationality. The 
repetition of the same reasoning and judgement from 
the Court in front of these repeated cases asserted, on 
the one hand the European legal standard of free 
movement of goods between Member States, and on 
the other hand the registered GIs as the only possible 
exception when origin signs are involved. Outside the 
European regulatory framework on GIs, a national 
legal protection mentioning the geographical origin of 
a product or of a class of products will always be 
considered as interfering with the free movement of 
goods between Member States. In order to be 
considered as an exception to the free movement of 
goods, a national legal protection of a quality sign 
mentioning a geographical origin has to be in keeping 
with the European regulatory framework of regulation 
2081/92, that is to say has to protect intellectual 
property represented by a registered PGI. This position 
may seem odd. It can be seen as in contradiction with 
the attempt of the EU to promote the protection of GIs 
at the international level.
7 However national legal 
protection for geographical origin signs outside the 
European legal framework constitutes, par excellence, 
a threat of a policy of discrimination in favour of a 
country’s own products. The aim of producing 
information for consumers (see section III) would 
therefore be of secondary importance. Requiring that 
national protection afforded to geographical origins 
signs complies with the European regulation on GIs 
protection the Court points out intellectual property 
rights, rather than quality per se, as the subject of 
 
7 At the international level the attachment of the European 
Commission to the European model of protection of Geographical 
indications is strong too however. [2] showed how the European 
will of unilateral harmonization of the international systems of 
protection of geographical indications on the European model 
contradicted National Treatment and raised the dispute over GIs 
arbitrated by the WTO. 
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matter of the legal protection. This base, compared to 
quality, is considered to be less likely to cause 
withdrawal behaviours on national products. 
In order to comment these decisions of the Court on 
substantive aspects, the reference to registered PGIs is 
explored. A PGI in the European Regulation is a name 
of a region given to an agricultural product or a 
foodstuff meeting three cumulative requirements 
(Article 2.1 of the European Regulation): (i) 
originating in that region, (ii) possessing “a specific 
quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable 
to that geographical origin”, and (iii) whose 
“production and/or processing and/or preparation” 
take place in that region. To be eligible for a PGI, an 
agricultural product or foodstuff shall comply with a 
product specification (Article 4 of the European 
Regulation). This document has also to identify the 
authorities or bodies verifying compliance with the 
product specification. Together with the definition two 
important features are underlined and highlight the 
‘nature’ of a PGI. First, only a group (any association 
of producers or processors working with the same 
agricultural product or foodstuff, irrespective of its 
legal form or composition) shall be entitled to apply 
for registration (Article 5.1 of the European 
Regulation). Second, a name registered under the 
European Regulation may be used by any operator 
marketing agricultural product or food stuffs 
conforming to the corresponding specification (Article 
8.1 of the European Regulation). 
These two characteristics show that in the spirit of 
the European regulator PGIs are defined, from the 
point of view of operators, as non rival (from the first 
characteristic) and non excludable (from the second 
characteristic) goods, or in other words, when 
considering these later properties, as purely public 
goods. As soon as an operator conforms to the product 
specification of a PGI, he can use this PGI without 
being able to prevent another operator conforming to 
the product specification from using it too. In a given 
area the number of operator marketing an agricultural 
product or foodstuffs corresponding to a PGI cannot 
be limited as a consequence. This clearly shows that 
the property rights represented by a PGI cannot be 
appropriated by an operator even if he is the only one 
marketing the corresponding product. Interpreting 
PGIs as ‘public goods’ is furthermore perfectly in line 
with the idea expressed in the European Regulation (in 
its Article 2) according to which the quality of the 
agricultural product or foodstuffs is essentially (or 
exclusively) due to the geographical origin, that is to 
say to human and natural factors historically 
constructed by the society, inherited and therefore 
escaping from the strict ability of the operators. An 
operator marketing a PGI benefits from the pre-
existing reputation of the PGI, and cannot be seen as 
its creator. The difference with a private owned 
trademark is here very clear. The reputation of a 
trademark is constructed by its owner. In line with 
this, a trademark owner can loose his property right if 
he ceases to exploit his trademark. A PGI, on the 
contrary, ‘never die’: the production of PGI can stop 
for many years and revives. 
The main consequence for the analysis of the 
Court’s judgements of this interpretation of PGIs 
underlining their public good dimension is 
straightforward. Sentencing the different Member 
States to pay the cost in the different cases, the Court 
did two things. First, it explicitly refused to consider 
the names and regional label at stake as intellectual 
property rights of the kind of PGIs. Second, it 
implicitly did not recognize the ‘status of public good’ 
to the concerned names and regional labels. If the 
status of intellectual property rights can be reach 
through other channels (such as trademark or 
collective trademark), the dimension of public goods 
is clearly lost. These remarks raise a series of 
questions. Shall we restrain the specific legal 
protection for origin sign that can be considered as 
public goods? What are the consequences (both 
private and social) of turning to trademarks in order to 
find a legal protection of intellectual property rights on 
geographical signs? Is this option always 
‘economically’ feasible? Can collective trademarks be 
considered as having a public good dimension too? If 
not, what are the consequences? Answers to these 
questions are given and their consequences explored in 
the next two sections. 
III. THE THEORETICAL CATEGORIES IMPLIED 
BY THE CASES 
In order to answer to the questions raised by the 
rulings of the Court presented in section II, the 
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possibilities of protection of the names and labels at 
stake, other than the national legal condemned 
protections, have to be explored. The history of the 
cases shows that some products, initially protected 
under the condemned national policy, became PGIs. 
Other products found protection under the auspices of 
national legal quality signs.
8 These two possibilities of 
protection clearly correspond to official quality signs 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs. They cannot 
however be considered as a haven of protection for all 
the products concerned by the ruling of the Court. For 
the products not corresponding to these quality signs, 
trademarks can be considered as another way of 
protection. A trademark can be owned by a single 
individual or by a legal entity representing a group of 
operators. This latter case is especially interesting 
when a single agricultural product is produced by 
several operators of small size which cannot run alone 
a trademark because of financial constraints. The 
grouping allows facing the financial cost of 
advertising in order to build or maintain a reputation 
for the trademark. It implies however coordination 
cost. We choose to focus on this form of protection 
since it underlines well the characteristics that, very 
likely, created the need for the national legal 
protections condemned by the Court in the cases 
presented in this paper. These trademarks owned by 
legal entities exist with ‘marques collectives de 
certification’ in France or ‘collective trademarks’ 
within the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (OHIM) at the European level for example. 
We call them indistinctly ‘collective trademarks’ in 
this paper. 
Interestingly, collective trademarks and PGIs are 
very close to each other. Both are intellectual property 
rights and meet, furthermore, on several points. A 
collective trademark such as the French ‘marque 
collective de certification’ is defined making reference 
to the origin of the product. Only a producers group is 
entitled to register a collective trademark as in the case 
of a PGI and the product specification that is so 
important for PGIs in the European Regulation, exists 
is an imperative too for collective trademarks and is 
now called ‘rule’. The idea according to which an 
                                                           
8 Saucisson sec d’Auvergne was protected under the regional label 
“Auvergne” and got the French quality sign ‘Label Rouge’ after 
the ruling of the Court. 
operator can use the collective trademark as soon as he 
complies with the requirements of the ‘rule’ is also 
present. 
The use of a collective trademark would therefore 
be non rival and non excludable. Shall we conclude in 
the public good dimension of collective trademark as a 
consequence, as we concluded in the case of PGIs? 
The answer is negative. To become a PGI, a GI has to 
apply for registration. The European Commission in 
order to accept or reject it has to evaluate two things. 
The first one is a series of points (Article 5.3 of the 
European Regulation) relating to the legitimacy of the 
product as a GI: the definition of the product, the 
definition of the geographical area, the description of 
the link between the product and the geographical 
environment and, “where appropriate, the specific 
elements of the product description or production 
method justifying the link”. The second one (Article 7 
of the European Regulation) consists in verifying the 
existence of objections to the proposed registration 
(due for example to conflict with generic names, 
existing trademarks etc.), the admissibility of these 
objections, and in taking a decision if needed. 
Compared to PGIs, the application procedure in the 
case of trademarks (and therefore “collective 
trademarks”) is less cumbersome in national 
regulations or in the directives of the OHIM at the 
European level. The appreciation of the legitimacy of 
the collective trademarks is rather general (novelty of 
the trademark, product with individual character, a 
denomination that shall not be contrary to public 
policy etc.) and the guidelines of the OHIM 
concerning proceedings before the OHIM focus rather 
on opposition procedures (the trademark shall be 
justifiable in the preceding sense and not in conflict 
with prior trademarks) than on the authenticity of the 
geographical indication per se. As a consequence, 
demonstrating the existence of a link between the 
quality of the good and the natural and human 
environment of its origin is not compulsory in the rule 
of a collective trademark. More latitude is given to 
operators of collective trademarks. This latitude can be 
exploited in order to obtain rules far more restrictive 
than PGIs’ product specifications. Here, the group of 
producers can be very restrictive limiting the access to 
other producers, erecting constraints on the production 
area and on techniques, in order to increase profits. 
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This clearly shows that a collective trademark is 
‘congestible’. As a consequence, we leave the pure 
public good dimension where, ideally, such congestion 
cannot appear to obtain club goods attributes (non 
rival, non excludable and congestible) for collective 
trademarks. These characteristics stand halfway 
between purely public good (non rival and non 
excludable) and purely private good (rival and 
excludable). What are the consequences for the cases 
under scrutiny? The next section deals with this point. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES 
The key word in the decisions of the Court was always 
the same: the preservation of the ‘free movement of 
goods’ between Member States. Is this rule a 
guarantee for the maximisation of the wellbeing of the 
society? This question is considered in this section 
looking first at informational problems and, second, 
with the help of the relation established between PGIs 
and public goods on the one hand and collective 
trademarks and club goods on the other hand. 
A. Free movement of goods, competition and information 
provision 
The rule of free movement of goods between 
Member States has normative roots. It is seen as a 
necessary condition for the competition on markets. In 
that perspective, the Court’s decisions clearly consider 
the national legal protections to names and regional 
labels in these cases as policies implying or favouring 
withdrawn attitudes of domestic consumers on 
national products. This kind of behaviour is seen as 
equivalent to implicit entry barriers and is banished. 
However names and regional labels are quality signs 
that give information to consumers in context of 
asymmetric information. A number of theoretical 
results points out the utility of a public intervention in 
such a context, since without signalling the market for 
high quality goods can collapse. The case of ‘credence 
goods’ ([3]), that is to say goods for which consumers 
cannot determine the quality neither before nor after 
purchasing them, is particularly sensitive. The 
geographical origin is typically a credence attribute for 
a good. Signalling to consumers this origin, when a 
demand for this attribute exists, is thus essential. The 
provided information allows transforming a credence 
good into a ‘search good’, that is to say a good for 
which consumers can check the quality before the 
purchase. Without signalling, the variety of goods 
available on the market would diminish, decreasing 
the consumers’ welfare. 
Signalling credence attributes is however puzzling 
[4]. Because these attributes can never be experienced 
by consumers signalling through prices or producers’ 
reputation hardly works. The certification of the 
credence attributes forms a way to provide the missing 
information to consumers. Here stands, as a 
consequence, an important aspect of the national legal 
protections of names and regional labels of the 
analysed cases. Making certification available, these 
national policies can be seen as organizing information 
delivery and would be therefore useful in a wellbeing 
maximisation perspective. Simultaneously, however, 
such policies protect producers from competition 
giving them a market power that increases their 
surplus but generating fewer exchanges than what 
would be optimal. As a result, the legal protection of 
the geographical origin would be justified if their net 
effect on the society’s wellbeing is positive. 
Something that has to be evaluated case-by-case has 
the economic literature shows. 
In order to characterise this situation, [5] considers 
a situation where producers of high quality goods 
(with high quality considered as a credence attribute) 
bear higher cost of production than producers of low 
quality goods, but can certificate the high quality and 
create a cartel allowing to diminish quantities 
delivered to the market so as to increase the price. 
Controlling that way the quantities of high quality 
goods supplied on the market creates incentives for 
producers to differentiate their production with high 
quality goods. Certification allows consumers to 
choose the quality they want and increases therefore 
their surplus. Considering a situation where the 
certification cost is high, the authors show that the 
positive effect of the certification is bigger than the 
negative one of the increased producers’ market power 
if the product differentiation allowed by quality 
certification is sufficiently high. This idea underlining 
that a sufficiently high product differentiation is 
necessary to make national protective policies and 
quality certification welfare improving can also be 
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found in [6]. The authors show furthermore that in a 
situation characterised by a high fixed certification 
cost and a large difference between the marginal costs 
of a high quality product and a low quality product, 
protecting geographical indications can lessen the 
society’s total surplus.  
These various results of the economic literature 
dealing with GIs protection can be used to consider the 
reference to free movement of goods used in the 
analysed Court decisions. They effectively show that 
the protection of GIs can be defended even if it alters 
competition on the market, since it can furnish 
valuable information to consumers. This property shall 
not be considered however as automatic and has to be 
evaluated case-by-case, with the certification cost, the 
degree of differentiation between the level of quality 
and the difference in marginal cost of production as 
key elements. 
B. Collective trademarks as club goods 
Once the national legal protection condemned by 
the Court, the affected producers can found protection 
under trademarks as underlined in section III. 
Collective trademarks are of particular interest in that 
perspective. They can mention the geographical origin 
of the product and they form a way to share the cost of 
the management of the brand image among operators. 
The latter characteristic is especially interesting for 
small businesses. The question of the feasibility of this 
strategy and the question whether, compared to the 
protection delivered by national regulations, this 
strategy is neutral from the society point of view have 
to be addressed. Answering to these questions allows 
better appreciating the consequences of the Court 
decisions. This issue is explored first considering the 
latitude offered to operators in the elaboration of the 
‘rule’ of a collective trademark and second taking 
account of the cost of the protection mode. 
As underlined in section III, one of the main 
consequences of turning to collective trademarks 
rather than PGIs in order to find protection is the 
latitude given to operators when setting the rule 
defining a collective trademark. This latitude allows 
the group of producers to adopt restrictive dispositions 
in order to limit the access to other producers in order 
to increase profits. Not only can the production area be 
limited but also the eligible techniques. The 
consequence of these practices can be highlighted. [7] 
for instance compare the different legal forms of 
production organisation allowing controlling the 
supply of high quality products (in order to make it 
profitable to producers): controlling the cultivated 
surface areas, implementing restrictions on the 
production process, combining the two formers. They 
show that these various modes of organisation of the 
supply impact differently on the total surplus of the 
society. A regulation that would favour restrictions on 
the production process without any other form of 
limitation can give incentives for producers to choose 
production techniques more restrictive than necessary 
to obtain high quality goods, and would imply an 
unnecessary social cost as a consequence. Looking at 
the sole free movement of goods in order to rule 
against the national protection of names and regional 
labels ignores this kind of effects that cannot be put 
apart as soon as the society’s surplus is taken into 
account. Another way to demark from the free 
movement of good criteria is to consider the 
comparative costs of the different forms of protection. 
The organization of the supply of goods that have in 
common a certain kind (here names or regional labels) 
of specificity but produced by different operators 
implies costs. These costs are different from the 
operating costs, concerning specifically coordination 
aspects between producers: product specification 
establishment, expenses in order to maintain the 
reputation etc.). Following [8], confronting these costs 
calculated per person to the benefits per person 
enables to determine the optimal size of the club. This 
is graphically presented in figure 1 (from [8]) where 
the number N  of producers constituting the club is 
presented on the X-axis and the cost and benefit per 
person are measured on the Y-axis. The concavity of 
the benefit curve B is explained by the congestion 
(first increasing and decreasing once a certain size of 
the club is reached), while the form of the cost per 
person curves Cs is explained by the cost per person 
function  C/N. The situations of the national legal 
protection and of collective trademarks are 
respectively represented with the cost curves C1 and 
C2. The optimal size of the club is reached when the 
derivatives of the cost and the benefit functions are 
equal. 
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Fig. 1 The optimal club size 
Banning legal national protection of the names and 
regional labels creates an external shock on the 
concerned activities. The operators’ coordination 
framework has to be reinvented and other forms of 
protection have to be found. Collective trademarks for 
example have to be created, their ‘rules’ specified, 
their brand images formed etc. This has the effect of 
raising the cost of coordination of producers (from C1 
to  C2) which, in turn, implies an increase in the 
optimal producers club’s size (from N1 to N2). More 
producers should be protected as a result, and those 
who were already protected under national legal 
protection will have lower market power as a 
consequance. This can be seen as a good new. The 
availability of these needed additional producers can 
be questioned however, especially in remote rural 
area. It can be noted that if the cost of protection 
becomes to high no producers club will emerge 
because of this availability constraint. These effects of 
the Court’s decision on the number of producers 
protected highlight another aspect of the problem than 
the mere free movement of good. Note that the benefit 
curve could have been affected too by the decision of 
the Court. If the information on goods’ quality 
produced by the collective trademark is less reliable 
than the one delivered under the national legal 
protection of names and regional labels, the benefit 
curve will move down with eventually a change in its 
slope. The overall effect on the optimal size of the 
producers club should therefore be evaluated case-by-
case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The relation established in this paper between PGIs 
and public goods on the one hand, and between 
collective trademarks and clubs on the other hand, 
highlights the ruling of the Court. Exceptions to the 
free movement of goods between Member States shall 
only be given to PGIs because of their implicit public 
characteristics. However the paper shows that when 
collective trademarks are recognized as a way for 
protecting the names and regional labels in the 
considered cases, alternative to the condemned 
national protections and to the European PGI, other 
criteria than the free movement of goods could have 
been taken into account in the Court decisions. An 
analysis that would focus on the maximisation of the 
society’s wellbeing would give weight to the 
information delivered to consumers, the latitude 
offered to producers to restrain their production and to 
the achievability of the producers club looking for 
protection under a collective trademark. Case-by-case 
studies would be of course necessary with probably 
divergent conclusions in the end. The invariability of 
the approach chosen by the Court along the different 
cases and the uniqueness of its conclusions underline 
well, in contrast, the primacy given by the Court to the 
free movement of goods over any other criteria. 
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